Skilled labour has gained significance as a production factor in the age of information technology, but accounting does not recognize human capital as an asset that contributes to the firm's earning power. This paper suggests a method to develop a latent index to proxy the managerial-skill component of human capital. The proposed index depends on the empirical validity of self-sorting theories for managerial tasks and the choice of the type of at-risk (i.e. outcome-contingent) compensation contract. The empirical analysis uses data on compensation of executive members of the board of directors, their personal attributes (experience, risk aversion and wealth), firm-specific variables ( profitability growth rates, organizational complexity and operating risk), and type of industry. The extent to which equity markets value the predicted labour skills shows that investors in the marketplace recognize human capital even though accounting does not. The valuation coefficient on the variable imputed for human capital is significant for all years examined. This study contributes to the literature by showing that relative incentive compensation (incentive pay per dollar of fixed salary) is a viable surrogate for human capital defined as the skills embodied in people.
INTRODUCTION
Consistent with the literature in economics, Topel (2000) defines human capital as 'the intangible stock of skills that are embodied in people'. Using this definition, this study examines human capital from the employers' point of view and provides a method that uses incentive compensation to develop a relative index for managerial skills. The proposed index derives from superimposing an incentive-compensation structure on a Cobb-Douglas production function and is estimated using variables for the individual manager (experience, risk preference, value of owned shares as proxy for personal wealth) and firmspecific variables that reflect managerial performance ( past performance on profit and growth, organizational complexity and operating risk). Once the index is estimated, the question of valuation arises. While economists view human capital as the skill that can be estimated by the life cycle earning capacity of the individual, accountants are more interested in measuring human capital as a resource to the employer. In neither case, however, is the methodology for placing dollar values on human capital well developed because the skills embodied in humans are inherently difficult to measure. In this study I address the accounting valuation problem only to explain the extent to which capital markets implicitly recognize labour skills when pricing a firm's equity.
In the empirical analysis I estimate the index of labour skills for executive members of the board of directors who are employees of the firm. The data were obtained from ExecuComp, Compustat and CRSP databases for the period 1996-2000. The number of firms included in the sample varied by year due to the availability of data and to the selection criterion that required some stability of management regimes. Data requirements were satisfied for 617 firms for the years 1996 to 1998, and for 520 firms for the years 1998 to 2000. Because of the inherent serial dependency of the data, the analysis is carried out for different subsamples. I first estimate the models and perform predictions and valuation separately for each year at three different levels: (1) for the CEO's position, (2) for other executives (firm employees) who are members of the board of directors (Oexecs), and (3) for the pooled data set. I then repeat this analysis to check for robustness: (1) using three randomly selected portfolios (of 15%, 20% and 30% of the pooled time-series=cross-section data panel); (2) using proxy for labour skills as a binary, indicator variable; and (3) using a different valuation model.
The results are consistent with the predictions of the model in that (1) the variables of risk preference, value of owned shares, organizational complexity, profitability, growth rates and firm operating risk are significantly related to the proposed latent index of human-capital; and (2) the forward predictions of that index are significantly associated with the market's valuation of common equity. These findings are reproduced even after transforming the estimated human capital variable from ratio-scale data into a binary indicator variable.
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The research problem of interest relates to two research questions: (1) How could this intangible human-capital resource be estimated as an asset? (2) Do capital markets impute a value to that asset? The relevance of these research questions arises from the dramatic effects of information technology on the mix of production factors in developed economies during the last quarter of the twentieth century. It appears that wealth creation is driven more by human innovations, new product inventions and fast communication than by tangible assets. The unprecedented advances in microchip technology and programming skills have significantly impacted every aspect of society, contributed to lowering transaction costs, and allowed enterprises to locate their activities in regions with lower operating costs.
Empirical evidence shows that [T] he shift toward more skilled workers appears to have accelerated in the last 25 years relative to , especially over the period from 1980 until the mid-1990s. Over this period, demand has strongly shifted from low-and-middle-wage occupations and skills toward highly rewarded jobs and tasks, those requiring exceptional talent, training, autonomy, or management ability. (Bresnahan et al., 2002: 339) Similar findings are noted in numerous other studies. For example, in a crosssectional analysis, Doms et al. (1997) find that 'plants that use a large number of new technologies employ more educated workers, employ relatively more managers, professionals and precision-craft workers, and pay higher wages ' (1997: 255) . Evidently, these developments are related to the talents of the labour force. Indeed, successful firms manage their business based on the knowledge that human skills are the resources that power the enterprise's earnings capacity.
While human resources management has progressed in recent years to adapt to these changes in the business environment, accounting systems have not. Consequently, economic resources such as software programming skills at Microsoft or the expertise in microchip technology at Intel are omitted from the set of recognized assets. For these types of firms, human capital is their most important asset. Not estimating a value for human capital and not recognizing it as an economic resource distort both amounts and relationships among the elements of financial statements. This brings us to the second research question. Notwithstanding accounting shortcomings, do capital markets value the quality of the labour force? If markets do value the firm's labour skills, it would be tantamount to market recognition of human capital even though accountants do not recognize it on the balance sheet.
To motivate the research questions, self-sorting theory in labour markets provides a framework to show that employees reveal their skills by their choice of compensation contracts. The more skilled employees select contracts with a higher proportion of performance-based (i.e. at-risk) compensation and earn, on average, higher compensation than others. Consistent with self-sorting, an index for relative incentive compensation is shown to be a function of operating (tangible) capital and labour skills. The index is obtained by relating the structure of compensation contracts to performance, with performance being measured as the output represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function. In this formulation, labour skills are substituted for the labour factor and are proxied by variables that contribute to the individual's capacity to perform and earn income. These proxy variables are of two types: individual-related (experience, risk preference and wealth surrogate) and firm-specific (history of profitability, growth and the operating risk of the enterprise).
To obtain a single proxy for labour skills, and test the identification hypothesis, I introduce the proposed Cobb-Douglas production function into a compensation contract so that relative incentive pay (RIC) could be expressed in terms of both tangible assets and the proxy for labour skills. RIC is defined as the ratio of performance-based compensation to base salary. However, we know that the incentive component of the exercised options is related to contemporaneous market prices of equity. The endogeneity of RIC with firm performance led to separation between estimation and valuation periods; labour skills index is estimated in one period and is predicted for another period, with the predicted index being used for testing the valuation hypothesis in the latter period. The predicted index is based on factors other than market prices. Furthermore, the predicted index is not derived directly from the RIC measures generated during the periods in which market prices are used for testing hypotheses. With reducing the threat of obtaining spurious relationships by the methods described above, the predicted proxy for labour skills is then used to test the following two hypotheses:
Human capital factors (experience, risk aversion and value of owned shares (surrogate for wealth)) are significant determinants of relative incentive compensation: H 2 : Valuation: Equity markets recognize and value the latent index of managerial (or labour) skills imputed from information on human capital factors and relative incentive compensation:
OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The recent interest in studying human capital evolved from the broader concept of intellectual capital. As noted from the concept's inception in Europe (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997) , intellectual capital is assumed to encompass human capital, organizational capital and customer capital (see also Petty and Guthrie, 2000; Lev, 2001) . This interest appears to be motivated, in part, by the need to explain the apparent large growth of unrecognized intangible assets. Large increases in market-to-book ratios in the past three decades provide evidence of this growth. Mouritsen et al. (2001) emphasize the role of increasing market-to-book ratio in reflecting omitted intangibles. They show how seventeen Danish companies report intellectual-capital statements in an effort to collaborate with the Danish Agency for Development of Trade and Industry in developing guidance for this type of reporting (Mouritsen et al., 2001: 741-2) . These projects are components of the MERITUM co-operative program involving the efforts of researchers in different EU countries to study intangibles. The governments of several European nations (e.g. Spain and the Scandinavian countries) are actively involved in this development.
The setting in North America is different. The debate on the recognition of human capital as an asset on the firm's balance sheet dates back to the 1960s and 1970s, but since that time there has been only a modest revival of interest in the problem. Until the mid-1970s, authors (e.g. Brummet et al., 1968; Flamholtz, 1969 Flamholtz, , 1971 Flamholtz, , 1999 Lev and Schwartz, 1971; Likert and Pyle, 1971; Elias, 1972; Likert and Bowers, 1973; Morse, 1973; Friedman and Lev, 1974; Sackman et al., 1985) proposed various methods for estimating and reporting human capital on the employer's balance sheet. Invariably, these methods consist of capitalizing some expected flow: lifetime income, the firm's abnormal earnings or the cost of recruiting and training personnel. However, dissenters like Dittman et al. do not share that view. They write: 'we are personally not convinced of the importance of human-asset accounting in external reports and the propriety of ''putting people on your balance sheet ''' (1976: 62) . Dittman et al. argue that different functions require different measures of human resources and that the arguments underlying reporting human capital hinge on simplistic assumptions. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm about human resources during the early 1970s led R. G. Barry, Inc., a then US publicly-traded firm, to experiment with reporting an asset value for human capital on its balance sheet (Caplan and Landekich, 1973; Flamholtz, 1999) . But, in the US environment, there is no current or extensive experimentation of the type undertaken in Denmark as discussed in Mouritsen et al. (2001) .
Although most researchers agree that human capital is the stock of labour skills embodied in people, authors use the term 'human capital' in different contexts to connote different concepts. In particular, there is difference between (1) the rights a person has to her or his own earnings (the life cycle theory), and (2) the rights of the employer to excess profits generated by investing in human resources. The former uniquely belongs to the individual, while the latter is a property of the firm.
The accounting approaches of the 1960s and 1970s are generally consistent with the view that the employer firm could only claim the benefits that accrue to it from developing and investing in human resources. Additionally, in this context, the fair value of the firm's claim to human-capital assets would be estimated like any other asset by the present value of its expected contribution to the firm's future earnings. This value would be estimated based on cash flows to be earned by the firm, not the individual. Thus, economists and accountants study human capital in different contexts and for different objectives.
The early debate on the accounting recognition of human capital ended without closure not because of confusion about who owns what aspect of human capital, but more likely because 'people and [information] technology were significantly less important to wealth creation in 1960s and 1970s' (Albert and Bradley, 1997: 68) . As these issues have grown in importance, researchers have returned to studying the problem.
Currently, researchers highlight the value relevance of intangibles by examining the association between some surrogates for omitted assets and equity market. Some of these unrecognized assets contribute to creating human capital. For example, Sougiannis (1994) considers the omitted asset of R&D, and Aboody and Lev (1998) examine the value relevance of the omitted asset of software developments. Few studies, however, have examined the value relevance of human capital, mostly because of the complexity of identification and measurement problems. Jagannathan et al. (1998) and Rosett (2001) examine the association between labour cost and equity risk, whereas Hansson (2001) uses data from the Swedish Stock Exchange to examine the different effects of growth in wages on equity returns for two types of firms categorized by book-to-market ratios: valuestock firms and growth-stock firms. In a different context, Amir and Livne (2002) examine data from football clubs to evaluate the returns to investing in human capital. They conclude, 'information about investment in human capital may be useful to investors and potentially capable of being accounted for as an asset ' (2002: 2) . The uniqueness of the Amir-Livne application lies in using actual prices paid to athletes, although no valuation is generated for the skills developed internally. Furthermore, paying high prices for football players limits their freedom to self-sort because these contracts do not allow players to re-enter the marketplace and, as a result, could contract only once.
LABOUR SKILL LEVELS AS A LATENT VARIABLE

Self-sorting
In reality, neither the talent (a credence good) nor the skill (credence and experience good) of an individual is observable. For this reason, the ability of a manager to lead, produce and affect change can be described in two ways: (1) ex ante in terms of job duties and specifications, and (2) ex post in relationship to the employers' performance as measured against known expectations. The information asymmetry between the employer and prospective employees gives rise to a problem of adverse selection: the employer has incomplete information about the skill level of any employee who is not yet hired. Therefore, 'absent any policy of mitigating this problem, the wrong kind of workers could be attracted to the firm' (Lazear, 1998: 47) .
In practice, business firms use different methods to mitigate the problem of adverse selection before hiring. They seek résumés and letters of reference, and conduct interviews with candidates, but labour market studies suggest, 'one of the most effective ways to induce the appropriate people to apply for a job is to structure compensation in a way that is attractive to highly-skilled workers, but less attractive to unskilled workers' (Lazear, 1998: 49) . That is, firms could design compensation policies that induce prospective managers to indirectly reveal their skill levels by their contract choice. Upon learning of the compensation structure of different firms, those jobseekers who have expertise in specific tasks will search for employment contracts that would reward their achievements in performing those tasks well. For example, individuals who have the ability to devise strategies for increasing market shares will be attracted to work for those firms that offer contracts to reward them on that basis. Similarly, managers who have the expertise to increase profitability by cutting costs and undertaking innovation will seek employment with firms that contract to compensate them for performance in these areas. In general, one outcome of self-sorting is that employees are differentially compensated on the basis of their relative abilities. For example, Lazear concludes that firms that pay piece rate (output-contingent pay) generally attract higher quality workers and report greater productivity than those that pay straight salaries (1986, 2000) . This process of self-sorting will continue after employment; the less able workers and those who are not compensated according to their skills will eventually change employers (Jovanovic, 1979; Lazear, 1998) . In addition, sorting within the organization might take a different form because of the diminishing problem of adverse selection. For example, Hvide and Kaplan (2003) develop a model in which delegation of job design within the firm allows high-ability workers to signal their ability by choosing different tasks.
Sorting theories have been used to analyse differential wages for different groups (e.g. male=female: Groshen, 1991) or different skills. But in the accounting literature only Raviv (1985) has raised this concept in his discussion of the association between incentive-plan adoptions for executives and shareholders' wealth. He made two pertinent points concerning the need to address the consequences of self-sorting, and the difficulty of disentangling the effect of self-sorting from the incentive to reduce agency cost. Self-sorting in labour markets, however, is a pre-contracting process whose post-contracting effect would be to align the interests of both stockholders and owners in two ways: (1) improving productivity by matching job requirements and hired skills, and (2) compensating managers based on their relative performance.
Two conditions are necessary for the labour market to effectively match the interests of employees and employers: (1) employers need to disclose their compensation policies, and (2) prospective employees must be able to estimate their expected compensation under alternative schemes. Employers and prospective employees, therefore, have the incentive to produce and search for information that would enhance sorting and job matching (MacDonald, 1980) . In this respect, one could argue that enhancing the pool of information available to the public about the structure of executive compensation policies is a beneficial externality of some recent accounting regulations (e.g. the Financial Accounting Standards Board; FAS 123, 1995) . This particular data source is of value in the research design discussed next.
Performance-based compensation and labour skills I benefited in this study by the research and empirical evidence on job selection and incentives for employees who perform tasks that are less complex than the tasks of top management. I assume in this study that the concepts found to hold in the labour market for other skills will also apply in the managerial markets, and further assume that, on average, managerial skills map onto relative compensation. It follows then that the information on incentive compensation could be used to infer the corresponding unobservable intangible. To show how this inference might be drawn, assume a simple Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
where y is output, B is a constant, K is tangible capital (productive assets other than labour), L is labour, a is the elasticity (marginal productivity) of capital, and (1 7 a) is the elasticity (marginal productivity) of labour, with 0 < a < 1, and e y is a random error term with an assumed standard normal distributional property N(0, s y ). The usual assumption is that the firm's goal is to maximize profits and is therefore operating in the region of decreasing returns to scale.
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Labour as a factor of production has two components: quantity (i.e. number of input hours) and quality (i.e. skill). Since labour hours are not homogeneous in skills, it would be more descriptive to substitute a skill-weighted variable, LS, for L. Making this substitution in (2) and taking the log of both sides, we have the linear function
Of the two production factors, only capital, ln K (e.g. tangible assets), is empirically available while ln LS has to be estimated or imputed. In this study, log total assets are used for ln K.
In general, any compensation policy in an agency is reducible to two primary components: (1) a fixed salary, and (2) at-risk compensation contingent on performance. If 'performance' in this contractual arrangement is related to expected output y, the basic compensation structure could be described by
where C is compensation, w 0 is base salary (which is endogenous because it is not independent of the portfolio mix of fixed and contingent pay, but I will assume that w 0 is exogenous for the purpose of developing the model), y is output as specified in the compensation contract, y is a parameter translating output into incentive compensation, and e c is a random error term that is N(0, s c ). By substituting (2) into (3), we obtain
By dividing both sides by w 0 , we obtain
where RIC ¼ C=w 0 and is the incentive pay per one dollar of salary, 2 an index of relative incentive compensation; m 0 ¼ y=w 0 ; m 1 ¼ (ya=w 0 ); m 2 ¼ (y(1 7 a)=w 0 ); ln K reflect tangible operating capital (i.e. log total assets); ln LS reflect labour skills; and the error term e cy ¼ (ye y þ e c )=w 0 .
It is useful to state one more definition at this point. Because predicted RIC, which is a ratio, is used to impute a proxy for human capital, the imputed labourskills index will also be denominated in a non-monetary scale. Therefore, assuming ln Lsi is a labour-skills index denominated in non-monetary units, q is the scalar of converting ln Lsi into dollar amounts, then ln Lsi is a transformation of ln LS by the scalar q in the form ln LS ¼ q ln Lsi and equation (5a) becomes
ln Lsi is not available in an archival sense and will be surrogated by proxy variables. Let these proxy variables be the elements of the set H, and h 0 is a row vector of coefficients on H, then substituting h
where
, u H is the related error resulting from using the proxy h 0 (H) for estimation, and other terms are as defined before. The random-error term u H has N(0, s H ) and is uncorrelated with any element in H. The proxy variables in H are discussed later in this study.
Rearranging (5c) to enable inferring ln Lsi, the human capital component would be expressed as
Or, simplifying,
; and e cyh is the sum of the two random terms and is assumed N(0, s(e cyh )). As indicated earlier, RIC is a relative incentive pay index and ln K is log total assets, both of which could be obtained from empirically available data.
3 If values of ln Lsi were available, empirical assessment of the relationship in (6) would be equivalent to estimating reverse regressions (Maddala, 1988) . Estimating ln Lsi will require estimating (6b) using proxies for human capital as is discussed below. To facilitate the presentation, Exhibit 1 includes a list of the variables used in the study; variables are also discussed as needed.
Risk preference and choice of compensation contracts
The self-sorting theory discussed earlier assumes that managers will contract for levels of incentive pay matching their skills with job demands, but the role of jobseekers' risk preferences in the selection process is less understood. This is relevant, however, because the standard assumption in agency models is that the manager is risk averse and contingent compensation contracts are a risk-
Exhibit 1 Definitions of variables y
Output, performance basis for compensation L Labour as a factor of production LS Labour skills as a factor of production Lsi Labour skills index H The set of human capital proxy variables RIC Relative incentive compensation ¼ (1 þ bonus þ long-term incentive plans þ value of options granted) t =salary ln K Tangible capital as a factor of production (¼ log total assets) age
The age of the CEO or average age of executive members of the board of directors tenure Number of years credited to the executive's retirement plan in the firm riskpref
The risk-aversion index measured by the ratio of unexercised exercisable options to total unexercised options orgcomplex Organizational complexity measured by the length of the chain of command or the number of hierarchical levels in the firm roa
The accounting income to total assets gr Five-year growth rate in revenues bv rep,tÀ 1
Reported book value of common equity at the beginning of the year Beta Market systematic risk as obtained from CRSP covar
The coefficient of variation of operating profits. The ratio of the standard deviation of operating profits to its mean measured over the preceding ten years vos Market value of shares owned in the firm managed by the executive p The firm's net income f (ln RIC T,P ) The forecasted or predicted relative incentive compensation in the prediction year 'P', which is estimated based on the coefficients obtained from model estimation in prior period 'T' where
The predicted latent index for human capital or labour skills using the data of year 'T ' for estimation and the data in year 'P' for both prediction of this index and estimating its market valuation. The predicted values are measured by [E(ln RIC T,P ) 7 g 2,T ln K P ]. In all cases, (P 7 T ) ! 2 years D(Lsi T,P ) Dummy indicator variable measured as 1 if f (ln Lsi T,P ) > mean, and 0 if f (ln Lsi T,P ) < mean sharing mechanism. The executive, however, does not have full control over the realization of the outcome basis of the compensation contingency (i.e. output or performance). In general, rational individuals (who are risk averse) would bear risk if paid an appropriate risk premium. The choice of form and extent of at-risk compensation will depend on the manager's risk-bearing propensity. It is, however, very difficult to empirically estimate risk preferences of individuals, especially those who are members of boards of directors. The existing empirical measures on estimating risk aversion have been generated experimentally by evaluating the investment and consumption habits of individuals. The instrument of a typical survey or experiment requests that subjects price a gamble or a pair of gambles. Hartog et al. (2000) use data from three surveys of pricing hypothetical lotteries completed by over 23,000 individuals (including 1,599 chartered accountants) to test the respondents' risk aversion. They find that, for all participants including the accountants, risk aversion declines with income and wealth. Similarly, Donkers et al. (2001) estimate risk aversion from the responses to hypothetical questions about lotteries contained in survey data about the saving habits of 2,780 Dutch households. Loehman (1998) elicited the pricing of a gamble of paired lotteries, while Schooley and Worden (1996) used the ratio of risky assets to wealth based on survey results of 3,143 households.
In non-experimental articles, Guay (1999) and Rogers (2002) use the ratio of options' vega to delta as a determinant of managing risk. Vega is the ratio of the change in the value of options to the change in volatility, and delta is the change in the value of options to the change in the value of the underlying asset or parameter (i.e. interest rate). Thus, the ratio of vega to delta is the average change in volatility to average change in the underlying asset or parameter. It is noted that neither one of these two factors is a personal choice of the executive, especially since executive stock options have no market. A different method of estimating risk preference is used in this study.
The measure of risk preference used in this study relies on individual choices of income and wealth made by executives. At any time stock options held by executives are either exercisable (vested) and in the money, or unvested and not exercisable. To exercise or defer exercising in-the-money vested options is largely an individual choice. If deferral is assumed to take place only in anticipation of higher stock prices and higher future compensation, 4 the magnitude of deferred vested (in-the-money) options would be an indicator of the manager's willingness to bear risk; deferral entails sacrificing a sure current gain for the prospect of expected higher gains at a future date. In this sense, deferring exercising in-themoney vested options is equivalent to purchasing a lottery ticket; its price is the compensation that could be earned if the options were exercised (i.e. current sacrifice) and the prize is the expected gain in the future. Holding a larger proportion of vested options implies a relatively greater inclination toward risk bearing, and vice versa. The executive's risk preference (riskpref ) is therefore measured in this study by the proportion of (unexercised) vested and exercisable (in-the-money) options to total (in-the-money) options held. A relatively high riskpref score reveals an executive with a relatively low risk aversion who would also accept greater risk sharing; i.e. relatively more at-risk pay. In contrast, a low riskpref score points to an executive with a relatively high risk aversion who prefers less risk sharing; i.e. would demand relatively higher salary and low atrisk pay. Given this definition, one would expect a positive association between risk-preference scores and RIC (relative incentive pay index).
A reduced-form relationship for labour skills
Economists (Schultz, 1961; Mincer, 1962 Mincer, , 1974 Becker, 1964; Griliches and Mason, 1972; Brown and Medoff, 1989; Bahk and Gort, 1993; Teulings, 1995) use several variables of skill building (i.e. learning by formal schooling or by doing) to evaluate human capital. In addition, the individual's own ability to earn income depends on her=his attitude towards bearing risk, which is also a function of personal wealth or endowment. As indicated above (equation (5c)), using h 0 (H) to proxy for human capital, ln Lsi would have the functional form
where h 0 is a row vector of coefficients, u H is an error term for using proxy surrogates, and the set of H proxy variables used in this study are as follows:
1 Variables capturing individual characteristics experience: surrogated by age for general experience, or tenure for firmspecific experience; risk preference: proxied by the ratio of exercisable, vested in-the-money options to total in-the-money options held by the executive (as discussed above); value of owned shares (vos): which is a surrogate for personal wealth.
2 Variables revealing the effectiveness of skill utilization profitability measured by roa, accounting income rate of return on assets; growth, measured by growth rate in revenues, gr; operating risk of the firm as measured by the coefficient of variation of operating income, covar; market risk measured by systematic risk (beta); orgcomplex, a proxy for the complexity of the organizational structure of the firm and thus indicates ability of incumbent executives to manage complex organizations; this variable is measured by the number of hierarchical levels (or the length of the chain of command) within the firm as developed in Abdel-khalik (1988b).
Substituting these variables for H in (5c), we obtain
with all terms as defined above.
Rearranging (8), we obtain the estimated index of labour skills, ln Lsi, as in (6):
with all terms as defined in the corresponding equation (6b).
What is needed now is to find a process by which the spurious correlation between human capital and share prices is isolated. To show how the system is to be estimated, it is relevant to refer to the time period used in this study (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . The data set, obtained as annual observations, is partitioned into two subsets T and P:
T ¼ data for the period 1996À98 P ¼ data for the period 1998À2000
T is used for estimation and P serves as a holdout sample for prediction.
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Predicting values for labour-skill indices takes several steps.
First, the regression in (8) is estimated for each year of the estimation period (T ) using OLS. Second, the coefficients estimated for T are used to predict the expected value of relative incentive compensation for the prediction period P. This prediction (or forecast) is denoted as f (RIC T,P ). Third, the effects of (tangible) capital (i.e. ln K P ) on forecasted value for relative incentive pay in period P are determined by multiplying ln K P in the prediction period by the appropriate coefficient (g 2T ) that was estimated for the estimation period T. Finally, the forecasted latent index of managerial skills, f (ln Lsi T,P ) is predicted for period P as:
where f (ln Lsi T,P ) is the forecasted labour-skills index in period P based on the coefficients estimated in period T, f (RIC T,P ) is the forecasted relative incentivecompensation index for period P based on applying the coefficients estimated in period T, g 2T is the coefficient on (tangible) capital estimated in period T, ln K P is the log of total assets in period P, and g 1 is a constant. The empirical analysis below assumes that (P 7 T ) ! 2 years, which leads to three estimated models and seven predictions as shown in Exhibit 2. The variables f (ln RIC T,P ) and f (ln Lsi T,P ) are critical for testing the Valuation Hypothesis.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Sample and data
The data used in the analysis are for US companies. The primary source of data is ExecuComp supplemented by information from the Compustat and CRSP databases. The period covered is 1996-2000. This five-year period is chosen for several reasons. First, the ExecuComp database started in 1992. Prior to that time no publicly available data sources provided the same information in a systematic way. Second, the early periods covered by ExecuComp suffer from a high frequency of data errors and omissions. Third, evaluating labour skills embodied in top executives requires a measure of stability of management regimes, which eliminated firms with frequent CEO changes. For the analysis of CEOs only, a firm is included in the sample if the CEO remained on the job for at least three consecutive years. For analysis of board members other than CEOs (denoted Oexecs), a firm is retained in the sample if the CEO did not change in the entire five-year period. The fourth criterion for data selection is firm size. Small firms with common equity (below $20 million) were excluded from the sample. A final data-editing criterion related to the size of relative incentive compensation (RIC). Some extremely large positive values of the index (less than 0.5% of total observations) were highly influential. For example, RIC for Warren Buffett of Berkshire-Hathaway dominated all the statistics before it was deleted from the sample.
The number of firms in the sample ranges between 520 (for year 2000) and 687 (for year 1996). These are the firms satisfying the above-noted search criteria in the three databases (ExecuComp, Compustat and CRSP). The total usable sample consists of 2,800 observations for CEOs and 5,926 observations for Oexecs (other board members who are also corporate employees). 6 The information on the variable 'age' was available for most CEOs but only for less than one-third of Oexecs. The variable 'age', however, was not a statistically significant determinant of RIC and much of the analysis is carried out without this variable.
Descriptive statistics about the sample are reported in Tables 1 and 2 . Size, measured by total assets, varies from a low of $62 million to a high of $642 billion (Bank of America) with a mean of $16.2 billion and standard deviation of three times as much. This variation is reduced by the logarithmic transformation of total assets: the mean of 'ln' assets is 8.24 with a standard deviation of 1.64.
Exhibit 2 Relationship of estimation and prediction periods
Estimation year (T )
Predictive relationship Prediction periods (P)
The log transformation of total assets is called for in the analysis since this is the measure used for capital, ln K, in the models discussed above and estimated empirically in this study (e.g. the model in (9)). The variable 'orgcomplex' is a scaled measure of the length of the chain of command or the number of hierarchical levels within the firm (Abdel-khalik, 1988b) . The organizational complexity index has an average of 9.26 (standard deviation of 1.48) and ranges between 4 and 13. The average systematic risk, beta (as estimated in the CRSP database) for these firms is 0.83 with a standard deviation of 0.45. Variability of income (available for common stockholders) is measured over the ten-year period preceding any year of analysis. The average coefficient of variation of income (i.e. the standard deviation divided by the mean, covar) is 0.87, and the standard deviation of covar is 3.25. Both of these variables are used for operating risk. CEOs and Oexecs have similar statistics on age, tenure and risk preference, but differ significantly on pay and wealth variables. Average age is 58.5 years for CEOs and 55.7 years for Oexecs, with 6.92 and 8.52 standard deviation for each group, respectively. As indicated earlier, however, age is not a statistically significant determinant of the relative-incentive index and was omitted from much of the analysis for Oexecs since it is available only for about one-third of the number of observations of the sample of Oexecs. Tenure connotes the firmspecific knowledge or experience and is measured by the number of years credited towards retirement benefits; the relatively high average tenure for CEOs reflects the promotion of insiders to the position of CEO but does not reflect the length of time being in the CEO position. Average tenure is 14.56 years for CEOs (standard deviation ¼ 15.10) and is 12.09 years (standard deviation ¼ 12.46) for Oexecs. The last personal characteristic showing similarity between the two groups is the measure of risk preference. Within the range of [0, 1], riskpreference scores average 0.55 for each group with a slightly higher standard deviation for Oexecs (0.28 versus 0.25 for CEOs).
The variables related to compensation and wealth differ significantly between CEOs and Oexecs. While RIC averages 5.12 (s.d. ¼ 12.04) for CEOs, the mean of RIC for Oexecs is 3.36 (with a standard deviation of 4.66). Average CEOs' salary is twice that of Oexecs (a mean of $789,000 versus $393,000); and average incentive compensation (sum of bonus and stock options) of CEOs is about three times that of Oexecs. Additionally, on average, CEOs own about six times as many shares as Oexecs. Average value of owned shares (vos) is $117 million for CEOs (with a high standard deviation of $561) but only $20 million for Oexecs (also with a high standard deviation of $270). Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between relevant variables. Of interest are the coefficients between log total assets (ln K ) and each of orgcomplex, net operating income and abnormal profits. These coefficients take on values of 0.60, 0.41 and 0.60, respectively. Since these variables are used as explanatory variables in a single regression function (estimated next), the question arises as to the effects of collinearity. As is indicated below, the Variance Inflation Index (VIF ) (see Chatterjee and Price, 1991) is the test used for collinearity and it shows that the relatively high bivariate correlations in this study have no significant effect on the variances and collinearity is therefore not an issue.
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Self-sorting, incentive compensation and human-capital assets 677 is carried out for each of the estimation periods T ¼ 1996, 1997 and 1998 separately, and for each group, CEOs and Oexecs. The results are shown in Tables 3 and 4 . While the number of observations of CEOs for this period is about 600 per year, the number of observations for Oexecs varied by year between 965 and 1,354 because (a) the number of executive employees on boards of directors differ by firm and (b) the criteria imposed for the stability of the management regime differ for the two groups as indicated earlier.
The following summary presentation of the estimation results reported in Tables 3 and 4 considers (a) the goodness of fit, (b) the consistency of results and (c) similarity of values and signs of significant variables.
First, the estimated models have adjusted R 2 values ranging between 0.20 and 0.32 with corresponding F-statistics statistically significant ( p < 0.001). Second, in all cases, the estimated coefficient on ln K (tangible assets) is positive and significant at p < 0.01. The estimated coefficient on ln K averages about 0.15 for the CEOs and 0.089 for Oexecs -the marginal effect of tangible assets on CEOs' relative incentive pay is much higher than that of Oexecs.
Third, of the proxies used for personal characteristics, risk preference (riskpref ) and value of owned shares (vos) show consistent results over time and across groups. The estimated coefficients on riskpref are consistently positive and statistically significant ( p < 0.025). In five of the six estimated models, the coefficients on vos (value of owned shares) are positive and significant ( p < 0.01). Also, rates of growth in revenues (gr) and beta (as one measure of the firm's risk) have significant coefficients. As expected, all significant coefficients are positive. Diagnostic checks for the OLS estimation (not reported here) revealed no significant concern with collinearity. Although the correlation coefficient between orgcomplex and ln K is about 0.60 (see Table 2 ), the variance inflation index (VIF ) testing the significance of variable collinearity is consistently below 2.5, while collinearity would be a serious concern if VIF ! 10 ( Chatterjee and Price, 1991) . Finally, after editing the data and omitting a few influential observations as discussed above, the chi-squared values of testing for heteroscedasticity (using the Huber-White test) are not significant at conventional levels.
Validating the latent index of labour skills
As noted earlier, the index of labour skills used in testing the valuation hypothesis is predicted for periods other than the periods of estimation. This is done to avoid obtaining results that could be caused by spuriously interpreted relationships. Spurious relationships would be expected for contemporaneous measures of share prices and realized index of incentive pay because a large component of the latter is contingent on the former. Prediction of ln Lsi for period P (1998) (1999) (2000) uses the estimated coefficients for period T (1996-98) reported in Tables 3 and 4 . This prediction follows the description shown in Exhibit 2. For each of these three years, we have two types of surrogates for skills: the first is the realized RIC that includes more than labour skills, while the second is the predicted index of labour skills, f (ln Lsi T,P ). In the process of evaluating the problem of endogeneity, we want first to establish that these two measures are not equivalent. This is accomplished by comparing two different sets of correlation coefficients. The Pearson correlation coefficients denoted r1, between f (ln Lsi T,P ) and realized RIC P , are summarized in Exhibit 3. These coefficients are significantly different from unity and the predicted index, f (ln Lsi T,P ), does not explain more than 7% of the variation (as the squared values of the correlation coefficients) in realized RIC P during the period 1998-2000.
Next, we want to estimate the correlation of the predicted index and the market value of equity during the prediction period, that is, r2 ¼ r( f (ln Lsi T,P ), mv P ). Noting r1 obtained in Exhibit 3, the problem of spurious relationships will continue to exist if r1 ! r2, and it would be reduced if r1 < r2. Estimates of r2 are reported in Exhibit 4. In comparing the coefficients in Exhibits 3 and 4, it is noted that in five of the six cells, r1 < r2. Measured by the squared value of the correlation coefficient, common equity market values explains between 5% and 19% of the CEOs' f (ln Lsi T,P ). Thus, the correlation between the market value of Exhibit 3 The correlation between predicted labour skills index and realized relative incentive pay equity and the predicted latent index f (ln Lsi T,P ) is unlikely to be due to the intervening factor of realized (contemporaneous) relative incentive pay. This result allows proceeding with testing the Valuation Hypothesis.
VALUATION OF THE LATENT LABOUR-SKILLS INDEX Valuation of labour-skills index as a ratio scale
The results of the preceding section suggest the viability of testing the Valuation Hypothesis, H 2 , to evaluate the extent to which equity markets price the unrecognized asset of human capital. For this purpose, the valuation model used is similar to the model adopted by Barth et al. (1998) . This model takes the form:
where the subscripts T and P refer to the estimation and prediction periods, respectively; mv P is the market value of equity at end of year P; bv PÀ1 is the book value of equity at the beginning of year P; p P is net income; f (ln Lsi T,P ) is the predicted latent index for labour skills obtained by the method detailed in the preceding sections; f 1 , f 2 and f 3 are estimated valuation coefficients; u vP is a random error term with expected value of zero and is uncorrelated with any of the valuation model's explanatory variables; all other terms are as defined earlier and summarized in Exhibit 1. Initially, the model in (11) was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). However, specification tests show that the valuation model is not linear in f; the tests are based on the likelihood ratio of a log-linear model to that of a linear model (Greene, 2003: 178-80) . Because the log-linear model is a special case of a more general non-linear specification, I repeated the test for linearity using the more general form of BoxCox regression (Greene, 2003: 498-501) . 9 In addition, I used the Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) method in a further attempt to address the issue of endogeneity noted earlier. The 2SLS is estimated using instrumental variables with the following specifications:
Endogenous variables are: mv P and f (ln Lsi T,P ); Instrumented variable: f (ln Lsi T,P ); Instrumental (exogenous) variables are: ln K P , tenure P , riskpref P , orgcomplex P , vos P , roa P , gr P , covar P , beta P , bv PÀ1 . With f 11 , f 22 and f 33 are valuation coefficients estimated by the 2SLS and all variables as defined earlier. The results of estimating BoxCox regression are reported in Table 5a for CEOs and Table 5b for Oexecs. The results of the 2SLS estimation are reported in Table 6a for CEOs and Table 6b for Oexecs. Consistent with the basis and frequency of predicting f (ln Lsi T,P ) discussed earlier, seven valuation models are estimated using each method of estimation for each group: the CEOs and Oexecs. Valuation models are estimated for the prediction period P ¼ 1998, 1999 and 2000 using the predicted values of f (ln Lsi T,P ) based on coefficients estimated during T ¼ 1996, for period P ¼ 1999 and 2000 using coefficients estimated during T ¼ 1997, and for period P ¼ 2000 using coefficients estimated during T ¼ 1998.
The results of the BoxCox regressions are significant in rejecting the linearity of the untransformed model. In all cases, the BoxCox l transformation parameter is significantly different from 0 (the linear case) and from þ 1 (the log-linear case).
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However, the estimated models behave as expected in that (1) the coefficients on bv PÀ1 are significantly different from zero (at p < 0.001), and are not significantly different from unity; (2) the coefficient on net income is positive and significant ( p < 0.01). The results of testing the Valuation Hypothesis (H 2 ) presented in Tables  5a and 5b suggest three properties for the predicted labour skills, f (ln Lsi T,P ):
(a) the fit-statistics for the models (Wald chi-squared ) are significant ( p < 0.0001); (b) the coefficients f 3 on predicted labour-skills index are positive; (c) significance levels, as measured by chi-squared for each of the f 3 coefficients, are consistently below 0.001; and (d) the magnitudes of the f 3 coefficients do not display any particular pattern when comparing the coefficients for CEOs versus Oexecs. Tables 6a and 6b , gives results that are very similar to those obtained using the BoxCox regression. That is, the estimated coefficients f 33 show the same properties as f 3 . This similarity of the findings using the two estimation methods suggests that (1) the endogeneity problem is substantially mitigated, and (2) the Valuation Hypothesis cannot be rejected; i.e. the results are consistent with H 2 -that equity markets appear to value the labour skills of top executive teams.
Estimating the 2SLS, reported in
Valuation using the skill index as a dichotomous indicator
In validating the results obtained above, the predicted index of labour skills, f (ln Lsi T,P ), is transformed into a binary (dummy indicator) variable, DLsi T,P , where DLsi T ,P ¼ 1 for high relative labour skills À if f ( ln Lsi T,P ) > the mean DLsi T ,P ¼ 0 for relatively low labour skills À if f ( ln Lsi T ,P ) the mean Replacing f (ln Lsi T,P ) with the dummy indicator variable DLsi T,P in equations (11) and (12), I obtain the corresponding regression:
where d 1 , d 2 and d 3 are coefficients, u vPd is an error term N(0, s d ), and all other terms are as defined before. As a parsimonious summary, the results of estimating (13) are consistent with prior findings of estimating (11) and (12) for both CEOs Table 5a BoxCox regression for valuation of predicted latent index for labour skills using net income -CEOs (dependent variable is market value of common equity, mv P ) (1) BoxCox transformation is used because diagnostic checks showed the model to be non-linear.
(2) lambda is the parameter by which the data are transformed for estimation. Notes:
(1) The dependent variable is log market value.
(2) Definitions of variables are in Exhibit 1.
(3) Superscript a means significant at 0.01 level. (1) The estimation uses instrumental variables -endogenous variables are ln mv p , f (ln Lsi T ); exogenous variables are ln K P , tenure P , riskpref P , orgcomplex P , vos P , roa P , gr P , covar P , beta P . (2) The dependent variable is ln market value. (1) The estimation uses instrumental variables -endogenous variables are ln mv p , f (ln Lsi T ); exogenous variables are ln K P , tenure P , riskpref P , orgcomplex P , vos P , roa P , gr P , covar P , beta P . (2) The dependent variable is ln market value. and Oexecs. The BoxCox estimation results for the CEOs are presented in Table 7a and the 2SLS are presented in Table 7b . The results are consistent with those using f (ln Lsi) as a ratio scale. The list of properties reported above for both f 3 and f 33 are repeated here for d 3 ; the only difference is in the magnitude of the coefficients on the DLsi T,P as compared to those obtained for f (ln Lsi T,P ), which is the result of changing scale. Thus, the Valuation Hypothesis (H 2 ) cannot be rejected whether using ratio or a binary scale for the predicted latent index of human capital.
EFFECT OF INDUSTRY TYPE
Different types of managerial skills are suited for different industries, which create segmentation in labour markets. For example, the managers hired by public utilities (electric, water, gas, etc.) do not, in general, search for positions with technology firms or financial institutions. The term 'public' used in reference to this industry is descriptive of the type of goods or services provided; it does not connote the type of ownership because the majority of public utility firms are (at least in the United States) privately owned and their equity shares are traded on stock exchanges. Thus, these firms have the same contracting and incentive problems as other firms. Unlike many other competitive industries, however, public utilities in the United States generate their revenues, to a great extent, as a function of the cost structure of their operations. This is the result of cost-plus pricing regulations and of dependence on large government subsidies when market forces fail (e.g. the recent case in the state of California). To the designers of the system, this is a fair exchange: public utilities guarantee continuous supply of service (e.g. electricity) and, in exchange, they are protected from competition and are guaranteed a fair rate of return.
It can, therefore, be argued that top executives of those firms would be more useful to their shareholders if they were skilful negotiators who could extract higher rates from the state public service commissions (see, for example, Abdelkhalik, 1988a; Lanen and Larcker, 1992) . As a result, the challenge for top executives to compete for selling the output of their firms in the marketplace is limited. In contrast, technology firms operate in a highly competitive environment in which barriers to entry are very low and risk is very high. Consequently, managing innovation, developing new products and entering new markets is crucial to the success of executives employed in the technology sector. This means that the abilities, talents and institutional knowledge required for managing companies in these two sectors differ considerably. This difference is manifested in different degrees of risk sharing and pay for performance (i.e. relative incentive pay) for these two sectors.
It is therefore plausible that the findings in this study do not apply to certain types of industries. To illustrate these differences, consider the summary results in Table 8 . This table shows the means of variables related to CEO compensation during the period 1998-2000 for a selected group of industries in comparison with Notes:
(1) The dependent variable is log market value (ln mv P ). the total sample. The industrial classification used is that of Standard & Poor's Industry Classification Index, which groups firms by the core businesses in which they operate. Seven industrial groups are presented in Table 8 : foods, healthcare, oil and gas, financial institutions, manufacturing, computer and information technology, and public utilities. It is clear from Table 8 that the index of relative incentive compensation (RIC ) varies widely across different industries. Average RIC ranges from 2.85 for public utilities to 10.34 for computers and information technology. In terms of the magnitude of RIC, financial institutions and healthcare industries are next in rank to computers and information technology. Inspection of detailed compensation components shows that the primary source of difference is not in the annual salary as much as it is in the value of stock options and annual bonuses. The sum of the latter two items average annually about $9 million for CEOs in computer and information technology and $1.6 million for CEOs in public utilities.
The empirical analysis of valuation of the predicted latent index of managerial skills was replicated for these different industry groups. The results show that the Valuation Hypothesis H 2 holds well for various industrial classifications, except for healthcare (classification 35), oil and gas (classification 40) and public utilities (classification 90). While this finding suggests the relevance of the unique features of different industries, it also suggests the need for further study of the institutional and market arrangements that cause these differences, which is the subject for another study.
ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Two types of robustness checks are carried out: the first is for the sample choice, and the second is for the valuation model. The data structure is a panel of crosssection=time-series observations. Because of serial dependency, pooling the data for analysis leads to understating the estimation errors as well as other estimation problems. For this reason, the preceding analysis is carried out year-by-year. In checking the reproducibility of this analysis, I replicated the results using random sampling. This replication is made for CEOs, Oexecs and the combined set. For each group, two sub-samples are selected at random from: an estimation subsample (equivalent to T in the preceding analysis) representing 15% of the data set, and a prediction sub-sample (corresponding to P in the preceding analysis) consisting of 30% of the total number of observations. This led to six random samples, two for each grouping. The results of these random samples confirm those obtained earlier for year-by-year analysis. 
SUMMARY
The aim of this study is to find a viable surrogate for human capital, which is defined as the skills embodied in employees, as it relates to the employer's assets. In the age of technology and information, human assets have become the primary source of adding value to their employer firms. As an intangible, however, investments in human resources are neither measured nor reported. As with any other asset, the value of human capital to the firm might be viewed as the present value of future income to the firm emanating from investment in human resources, and the research question of interest is whether capital markets recognize and value this asset even when accounting does not. Concurrent with the information revolution is the increase in the proportion of at-risk compensation; incentive pay and stock-based compensation have become mainstays in the modern corporation, especially in North America. In this study, relative incentive pay per dollar of salary is used to estimate a proxy for the extent to which a firm values its management team. The basic motivation draws on the self-sorting framework in labour economics: the more-skilled managers will choose to work for firms that reward them more for employing their skills. That type of manager would seek higher expected compensation based on performance instead of accepting a guaranteed, but lower fixed pay. The literature in labour economics has shown that informed labour markets exhibit this self-sorting feature.
Accepting the definition of human capital as the skills embodied in people, I propose that relative incentive pay in a Cobb-Douglas world depends on two types of capital: human capital and tangible productive assets. For empirical analysis, I assume that labour skills depend on personal variables (experience, risk aversion and value of owned shares) and proxies for the ability to manage (return on assets, revenue growth rate, organizational complexity and operating risk). Along with relative incentive pay and tangible capital, these variables are used to estimate and forecast a latent index for labour skills. To determine the extent to which labour markets recognize and value the intangible assets that are not reported by the accounting system, the predicted latent index is included in an equity valuation model.
The data used for empirical analysis are obtained from ExecuComp and other public data sources. The analysis is carried out for the period 1996-2000 for a sample of about 600 firms. Imputed labour skills indices are predicted for CEOs, Oexecs members of the board and for a combined set of both groups. The empirical estimation uses OLS, BoxCox regression and 2SLS. The Valuation Hypothesis tested using the valuation model of Barth-Beaver-Landsman (with book values of equity, net income and omitted variables as determining price). The omitted variable in this case is the predicted latent index for labour skills measured as (a) a ratio scale or (b) a dichotomous indicator variable.
The contribution of this study lies in substantiating the feasibility of using relative incentive compensation (incentive pay per dollar of fixed salary) as a surrogate for human capital. The basic results are based on (a) developing a latent index for labour skills as a derivative of relative incentive pay, and (b) validating that index using capital market valuation of unrecognized assets. The findings of this study are consistent throughout the analysis using both ratio and dummy indicator scales.
Further analysis, however, shows that the results do not hold for some industries (e.g. public utilities), which is an issue that extends beyond the scope of this study and is left for a future project.
5 This analysis is replicated using random samples for the estimation and prediction periods T and P. 6 I had expected that the risk preference scores would differ between the CEOs and Oexecs. However, the data do not bear out this expectation. Examination of this issue is deferred for a future study. 7 I used STATA in all the empirical analyses reported in this study. The preferred test for collinearity is based on the degree to which the variance is inflated due to the collinearity of variables. This index is discussed in Chatterjee and Price (1991) . I used STATA for all the analyses. 8 It would be desirable to estimate the coefficients m 1 and m 2q for each firm separately.
However, a long time series is required for estimation of firm-specific parameters. The cross-section analysis, therefore, is only a representation of average results. 9 The reason for using the log-transformation to begin with in the previous drafts is due to the non-linearity of the models used in Barth et al. (1998) and others. Testing for non-linearity is based on the likelihood ratio of estimating models under different specifications. For example, consider the BoxCox regression:
where for any of the explanatory variables, say it is x, the transformed value x (l) is measured by x (l) ¼ (x l 7 1)=l; if l ¼ 1, the model is linear, and if l ¼ 0, the model is log-linear; otherwise, the model is non-linear of a different form.
To illustrate the test carried out in this paper, a comparison for the valuation model for P ¼ 1999 using the predictions based on T ¼ 1996 is shown below: Greene, 2003 ; all estimation and tests are carried out using STATA). 10 The BoxCox transformation requires that all variables be greater than zero. To satisfy this property, I added a constant to each variable. Adding a constant does not alter the results of estimation. 11 The tables presenting the results of the random samples are available from the author on request.
